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"We didn't mind what they thought as long as they let us in...." 
  -script from the film, "Adventure in Sardinia" (1948) 
 
 
For most of us, mosquito eradication may be one of our secret hopes.  At least in 
this instance, we might ignore biocentric arguments that remind us that these creatures, 
too, deserve a place in the great chain of being.  The little brutes, after all, serve as fish 
fodder or bat fodder;  swarms of them coax caribou herds to migrate each summer across 
the arctic plains -- in fact caribou lose so much blood during the mosquito season, that 
they must compensate by consuming extra calories and so transform arctic grasslands in 
the process. Mosquitoes undoubtedly occupy vital niches in ecosystems from the poles to 
the equator.  Yet mosquitoes are almost never protected by environmental regulations.  
The U.S. Endangered Species Act, for one, does not apply to insects that are pests that 
pose an "overwhelming and overriding risk" to humans.1  While working in the 
Rockefeller Archives Center this summer, I discovered that the mosquito war is alive and 
well when helicopters began spraying plumes of insecticide over New York City as a 
measure for controlling West Nile Virus. 
Eradication is an old dream.  Health officials, agriculturists, even nature 
enthusiasts have long set out to definitively rid the land of some its most noxious 
creatures. Together with mosquitoes, there are flies, roaches, ticks and other creepy-
crawlers that people sought to exterminate either because they carried disease, devoured 
crops, or inflicted some other insufferable nuisance.  Wolves have long been public 
enemy #1, and still are in many parts -- and the methods of exterminating them have been 
brutal and gory.  When potato farmers saw their plants devoured by beetles, they tried 
covering the leaves with crude oil, red lead and molasses, Paris green, London purple, 
DDT -- or they resorted to simple finger-squishing -- all with the dream that Colorado 
potato beetles would vanish from the face of the earth forever.2  Taken together, these 
creatures appearing on the "most-wanted" lists were often termed "vermin."  If plants, 
they were called "weeds."  Introduced animals and plants -- the aliens, invasives, and 
exotics -- have been favorite targets in organized eradication programs largely because 
native inhabitants readily witnessed the disruptions (or changes) to ecosystems brought 
about by the invaders. 
Some eradication programs have been successful: the South American muskrat 
(or coypu) was eradicated from Britain in the 1980s;  the Citrus blackfly from Florida in 
the 1930s;  the Gypsy moth from Pennsylvania in the 1920s.3  Earlier, the dodo and 
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passenger pigeon were mistakenly eradicated, but this unplanned eradication is called 
"extinction."  Eradication is purposeful, usually local, though ideally global.  Fred Soper 
defined eradication as "the ultimate in species reduction and implies the world-wide 
extermination of a species."4
Soper was the mastermind of the Sardinian Project, a massive effort funded by 
post-World War II relief monies and administered by the Rockefeller Foundation for the 
purpose of ridding the island of malaria-carrying mosquitoes.  Some 10,000 tons of DDT-
mixture were doused on Sardinia between 1946 and 1951.  The goal was to kill every last 
specimen of Anopholes Labranchiae on an island two-thirds the size of Switzerland, 
covering more than a million and a half separate swamps, springs, wells, and creeks or 
wherever mosquitoes survived and bred.  At the height of this campaign, 32,000 DDT 
sprayers combed the island. This Lotta Anti-Anofelica, or mosquito battle as it was called, 
was really the last tactic in a string of battles against Sardinia's millennial struggle with 
malaria.  Where malariologists around the world spoke of eradicating malaria, in 
Sardinia they spoke of eradicating mosquitoes.  Sardinia was the first large-scale testing 
ground for ridding mosquitoes from the face of the earth.  According to official sources, 
the project came to within 99.936 % of achieving success:  they missed a few 
mosquitoes. Although the Sardinia Project successfully rid the island of malaria, 
mosquitoes still persisted there.  Some purists considered the project a failure.5
Americans and Italians now generally celebrate the project as a stunning success, 
with village main streets across Sardinia being renamed Via Rockefeller during various 
commemoration events.  Where in the 1930s more than 70,000 Sardinians suffered from 
malaria, in the 1950s, just three or four malaria cases persisted among all of the island's 
1.2 million inhabitants.  Killing mosquitoes had indeed killed malaria.  But the question 
remains as to whether the Rockefeller Foundation was justified in seeking mosquito 
eradication.  Precedent projects in the United States, in the South Pacific, Latin American 
and Africa, and in the Italian peninsula itself showed that malaria could be extinguished 
by killing many but not all mosquitoes;  an 80 to 90% reduction in the mosquito 
population was sufficient to disrupt a malaria epidemic.  Expenses and materials both 
could have been saved by eradicating the disease instead of the vector.  Sardinian Project 
administrators estimated that in nearby Corsica, also plagued by malaria, just one-third to 
one-fourth as much DDT would be needed if the target was merely malaria instead of 
mosquitoes.6
Such issues were crucial in 1946, a year poised on the edge of the DDT age, an 
age when bothersome insects could be eliminated with the push of an aerosol-can button.  
Mere grams of the chemical could be diluted and sprayed into houses or over 
swamplands to continue killing mosquitoes and flies for months.  Thousands of soldiers 
and civilians owed their life to DDT for controlling typhus and malaria epidemics, and 
the rest of the world was eager to share in this chemical's new benefits.  But problems 
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with the miracle insecticide were already known or suspected.  Most obviously, DDT was 
a poison, and anything that killed bugs might also kill fish and birds, sheep and people -- 
and there were published and private reports in Sardinia and beyond, that claimed DDT 
did all of these things. 
The eradication question therefore centered on risk analysis:  was malaria or 
insecticide more dangerous?  In wartime, soldiers were assumed to face greater danger 
from malaria than from DDT.  But the same might not be true in peacetime when there 
was less shooting and more time for planning.  How did the Rockefeller Foundation 
justify subjecting Sardinians and their island to DDT concentrations that were 3 to 4 
times higher than absolutely necessary? 
 Risks were certainly present.  In July 1946, Fred Soper wrote to his Rockefeller 
Foundation colleagues that, "With regards to the Sardinian Project, there may be 
contraindications to the widespread use of DDT."   Soper explained that at a recent 
meeting in California of Agriculture Entomologists, he had heard reports that animals 
eating forage treated with DDT, in turn produced milk with high DDT concentrations.   
He also relayed his private conversation at the recent meeting of the American Medical 
Association in which he was told of rabbits and birds dying after airplane application of 
DDT.  Soper's correspondents, including Sardinian Project superintendent, John Kerr, 
showed a keen interest in these news items.  A few months later, Kerr also inquired about 
the toxicity of the solvent used in the DDT emulsions arriving in Sardinia, noting that the 
label on the DDT barrels stated:  "Avoid excessive inhalation and skin contact ....  Do not 
use on humans."  These scattered warnings, together with the wider evidence uncovered 
by Edmund Russell in U.S. War Department records, demonstrate that DDT risks were 
already on the minds of all thinking scientists and malariologists.7
Still, these risks were not communicated to the Sardinian public.  The public 
notice tacked on village walls a day or two before DDT house-spraying squads arrived 
made it clear that there was very little to worry about.  Small children, it stated, should 
not be allowed to stay in rooms being sprayed "because petroleum mist coming into eye 
contact may cause a little burning."  Also, "food and water containers must be covered so 
that they don't take on the smell of petroleum."  In bold letters it added:  "One must keep 
in mind that in the quantities used, these sprays are absolutely harmless." 
 A little more than a year after Soper's letter about contraindications, Kerr quit his 
job as superintendent, being transferred back to the U.S. to work on other Rockefeller 
Foundation projects.  The real reason for Kerr's resignation was not made public, with the 
official excuse blaming Kerr's health.  In fact Kerr, although concerned about DDT risks, 
was even more troubled by the overwhelming challenge of directing a campaign aimed at 
killing every single labranchiae mosquito, whether adult or larva, across an enormous 
and rugged terrain.  Kerr wrote to Soper that: 
In my opinion, the organization of comprehensive anti-larva work in the 
portion of Sardinia which has an elevation of up to 1,000 meters is an 
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impossible task.  Call me a pessimist if you will, but the word impossible is in 
my vocabulary, and I intend to keep it there.8
Kerr and all malariologists knew that the Sardinia Project was premised on recent 
mosquito victories in Brazil and Egypt.  In northeast Brazil in the late 1930s, and in 
northern Egypt in the early 1940s, Soper directed projects that successfully eradicated 
Anopholes gambiae, another species of malaria-carrying mosquito.  In these cases, the 
mosquito was an exotic, introduced species from central Africa that was already feeding 
malaria epidemics.  Relying on traditional pesticides like Paris green (which contained 
arsenic), Soper and his armies of sprayers tenaciously and meticulously eliminated every 
last trace of this mosquito -- and these projects were rapidly becoming legend.  To 
ambitious malariologists, these local successes suggested expanding up the Nile and up 
the Amazon to cover subcontinental, even continental areas.  Sardinia was the test case, 
or "experiment" as it was finally admitted, for trying eradication on a very large scale that 
involved a native mosquito endemic to the Mediterranean.  Compared to its precedents, 
Sardinia was bigger, but then DDT was stronger.  For people like Fred Soper, DDT 
offered an amazing opportunity to definitively eradicate mosquitoes.  Today Sardinia, 
tomorrow the world. 
But dissenters like Kerr protested that eradication of native mosquitoes was 
something entirely different. In his pessimistic note to Soper, Kerr added that, "The fact 
that gambiae was eradicated in Brazil and in Egypt without much thought having been 
given to ecology does not obviate the need for very careful studies regarding indigenous 
species of anopheles in other areas."   Soper in response growled to a colleague that, "It is 
indeed to be regretted that the word 'ecology' was ever invented, or having been invented 
came to [Kerr's] attention."  Soper also hoped that Kerr would "not get involved in 
studying too many non-essentials and collecting masses of data from which no 
conclusions can be drawn."  Two months later under a new superintendent, the Sardinian 
experiment would continue for four more years to include an extended all-out campaign, 
with one Rockefeller Foundation officer mentioning that Foundation "prestige as well as 
word is involved."  Another officer rejoined that, "The eyes of the world are on the 
Sardinian Project."  As it turned out, ecology was at the center of Sardinia's mosquito 
eradication failure.9
 Public health experts now refer to "malaria landscapes," which differ from region 
to region.  In the tropics, malaria is fostered wherever humans settle new areas, cut down 
forests, build dwellings, and maintain open water sources.  In Tanzania malaria is 
traditionally termed mbu;  in Somalia the disease is called canda-dilmaio, with both 
words being synonyms for "mosquito" itself.  But in Europe, the disease was long called 
swamp fever;  or paludisme in French;  mal-aria (bad air) in Italian -- all names 
associated with places more than mosquitoes.  In tropical Africa, Anopholes gambiae 
spreads the disease, preferring domestic, human-modified habitats, breeding in open 
water containers.  In temperate Europe, Anopholes labranchiae transmits the disease, 
preferring to breed in stagnant ponds with abundant aquatic plants.  In short, targeting the 
mosquito makes good sense in the tropics, but targeting the habitat is a good strategy in 
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temperate climes.  The most dangerous mosquitoes in the tropics hang out near villages, 
which can be sprayed for effective control;  but dangerous mosquitoes in the 
Mediterranean can live anywhere, from villages to mountain tops.  Malaria may really be 
a north-south issue. Due to different mosquito species, pesticides may be very useful in 
the jungle, but relatively useless everywhere else.10
 Mussolini probably understood a good deal of mosquito ecology when he laid out 
plans for the "Bonifica Integrale," the massive drainage program designed to control 
malaria while producing arable farmland.  Draining marshes and lakes, deepening rivers, 
embanking streams -- and any other method for getting water off the land -- were perhaps 
the first effective ways for controlling temperate malaria.  Such habitat modification, 
together with low-priced quinine (the drug acting on the transmitted parasite itself), were 
the main reasons why Italy's malaria epidemics were already tempered when the 
Rockefeller Foundation arrived.  As not often noted in official Foundation reports, from 
1918 to 1940, government figures show Italy's malaria deaths decreasing by 96%, with 
Sardinia recording similar percentages over the same period:  3800 malaria deaths 
dropping to 138.  There were still lots of malaria sufferers across Italy, and malaria 
incidence flared during the war with disruptions to drug distribution and drainage 
programs, providing a real need to address the rising malaria epidemic in 1945.  But the 
Rockefeller Foundation's insistence on carrying out a mosquito-based rather than habitat-
based malaria campaign did not make good sense, even with the appearance of a wonder 
insecticide like DDT.  It made sense only if the project was an experiment. 
 Italy's own malaria experts, themselves international leaders in malariology, were 
divided over Rockefeller Foundation strategies. Italian scientists had unraveled some of 
the basic principles of malaria medicine, including co-discovering with their British 
colleagues the plasmodium parasite carried by the mosquito.  Italy actually housed two 
malaria institutes;  the older more established institute received generous support from 
the Italian government, while the other was born in the 1920s, again, from Rockefeller 
Foundation monies and counseled by an earlier generation of American experts.  Partway 
through the Sardinian campaign, a number of Italian malariologists became more openly 
critical of the reliance on heavy DDT spraying.  One of Sardinia's newspapers spoke 
disparagingly of what it called "American" methods aimed at eradication, while calling 
for more "Italian" methods aimed at killing only enough mosquitoes to disrupt malaria 
transmission.  As DDT residues continued accumulating, Sardinians were becoming less 
convinced that they wanted their island to be the test case for mosquito eradication.  If 
malaria biology divided north from south, malaria politics divided Italy from the United 
States.11
 In the field, Sardinians were seeing many more problems.  Some farmers 
complained that their well water tasted bad after DDT spraying, and a few of them fired 
shots at sprayers.  One sprayer even ate a bit of pure DDT in order to convince a farmer 
to allow him to continue spraying.   Yet other farmers maintained that their sheep had 
been poisoned;  bee keepers filed complaints about dead bees;  fish farmers threatened 
court action when their fish died after airplane spraying.  In some cases, these 
complainers were mailed the results of scientific tests showing that DDT was harmless.  
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The new superintendent spoke nervously about these accumulating law suits, but was 
finally relieved by court judgements, as the one in June 1949:  "We have been completely 
exonerated from all claims by bee keepers.... [Moreover] The commission [for Damage 
Claims] agreed to settle no fish or land damage claims on a friendly basis as this would 
lead to a rush in clams."  So the project certainly had its local supporters. But by then, 
morale was at a low point with mounting grassroots resistance, professional differences 
of opinion, and continued mosquito sightings even after heavy spraying that pointed to 
the likelihood of mosquito DDT-resistance.  Even though malaria was almost completely 
gone from the island by 1950, the superintendent reported dejectedly that "the eradication 
of an indigenous vector is a far more difficult proposition than the eradication of an 
invader."12
 In closing the Sardinia operations the next year, American administrators offered 
suggestions to Italian leaders for follow-up procedures on mosquito eradication.  The 
Americans claimed that vector eradication, in the long run, would be cheaper than vector 
control, which required indefinite annual spraying and expenditures.  There was also the 
understanding that the eradication campaign had pumped some 12 million dollars of labor 
and materials into a depressed Sardinian economy.  But the Italians paid them almost no 
attention.  "It was obvious from the beginning that [they were] not interested in further 
eradication," reported the superintendent at the last meeting with his Italian successors; 
"however, they gave our proposals a polite hearing and we have had the satisfaction of 
getting our views on record."13
******* 
 Sardinia at the 50th anniversary of the Anopholes eradication campaign has 
become a favorite place for testing long-term DDT toxicity.  Death rates and causes, 
cancer rates and types, are carefully tabulated, both for former DDT sprayers and for the 
Sardinian population.   To date, there is no study that concludes Sardinians suffered from 
DDT-caused health problems.  A battery of other tests beyond Sardinia that investigate 
links between DDT and human health suggest that DDT really isn't very dangerous to 
humans -- with possible, discreet exceptions for small children and lactating mothers. 
However, other studies demonstrate that small creatures are acutely affected by DDT, 
particularly fish and birds.  And so DDT opponents have more grounds to focus on 
disruptions to ecosystems than on disruptions to human health.  If DDT was or is useful 
for controlling malaria -- today's most widespread disease that kills a person every 14 
seconds -- then we must really analyze risk:  Risk from DDT, risk from substitutes like 
pyrethrum (while organic is measurably more toxic), risk from habitat changes like 
draining.  Even supporters of POPs, the Persistent Organic Pollutants treaty currently 
being debated in the United Nations, have been considering risk, as they now generally 
agree that limited DDT campaigns can lower the chances that humans contract insect-
born diseases. 
Looking back at the Sardinia Project, one realizes that wetlands undoubtedly 
suffered under malaria programs that relied on drainage.  The advent of DDT, and so a 
new reliance on spraying insecticides instead of draining marshes, in turn saved more 
than one wetland bird or fish or plant.  Like the cartoon of whales in the nineteenth 
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century who celebrated the first extraction of petroleum because they would no longer be 
butchered for their oil, many wetland creatures also had cause to celebrate the first 
demonstration that DDT ruthlessly killed some of humanity's most noxious insects.  The 
invention of DDT meant that many wetlands could remain wet. 
 DDT did help control malaria around the world, thereby saving millions of lives.  
But the Rockefeller Foundation did submit Sardinians to DDT levels that were much 
higher than was necessary for extinguishing malaria.  Padded by technological hubris and 
post-war hegemony, the Rockefeller Foundation knowingly took a risk -- a small risk to 
humans as it turned out, given the characteristics of DDT's toxicity.  The Foundation had 
eradicated mosquitoes elsewhere, and it might have eradicated them on this island.  But 
one must consider whether that risk was worth it, or whether Sardinians were aware of 
these risks or even of the real goal of the project;  or why other islands lying closer to 
home, like Long Island, were not chosen as the experimental site for eradicating a native 
mosquito. 
A last point:  when in the 1950s the World Health Organization undertook global 
malaria control operations based largely on Rockefeller Foundation precedents, it made 
the decision not to attempt species eradication.  The world was thereby saved metric tons 
of DDT.  Living organisms everywhere were spared because of the results in Sardinia.  
For those of us living outside of Sardinia, we have the Rockefeller Foundation -- and 
Sardinians -- to thank for saving us the risk of 3 to 4 extra squirts of DDT. 
 
 
